The US and Iran have little choice but to strike a deal. This has been an unspoken truth since the war began, but it is even more evident in the five days since the end of the ceasefire.
For the United States, the first round of talks in Islamabad, despite its marathon duration, appeared to be a coordinated performance aimed at consolidating American influence. The Iranian port blockade was implemented so quickly that the White House likely already had this escalation in mind. It will take time to fully understand the economic pain the blockade is about to inflict on Iran, but even if it is 60% effective, it will still spell further devastation for Iran’s economy and its oil-dependent allies such as China.
The chances of a successful second round of talks increase depending on the political urgency and the status of those at the table. US President Donald Trump has openly said he wants a deal and that Iran does too. But most of all, with inflation and gas prices rising and MAGA bases in open rebellion, President Trump needs an agreement quickly.
It’s hard to fathom whether President Trump’s ever-changing positions are the result of a lack of attention, a memory problem, or an unconventional negotiating genius. However, making it difficult for the other party to understand what the other party wants has its limits as a negotiation strategy and can lead to confusion and hopelessness. And the confusion underscores how much President Trump needs a deal, by design or by default.
Iran needs a deal more urgently, even though it won the memetic war, unleashed unprecedented fires across the region, and endured the brutal destruction of its cabinet and security apparatus. The Internet of propaganda is not the real world. No matter how much fuss we make every day about how effective the CENTCOM attacks are, the situation in Iran, where more than 13,000 targets have been hit, is even worse.
The damage caused by the 39 days of bombing is irrefutable. Critics of the United States like to ridicule how one Khamenei was replaced by another, but Mojtaba has yet to appear in public and has not been convincingly proven to be conscious. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is currently in its third tier of leadership. They may be agitated hardliners seeking blood revenge, but that doesn’t exempt them from tough challenges from governments and from replenishing their forces for future conflicts. Talking like you’re 10 feet tall doesn’t make you actually taller.
Iran’s apparent strength derives from survival and defiance—remarkable perseverance—rather than actual military victories. However, we are currently in a period of unprecedented regional weakness. It has launched military attacks on most of the Gulf states. Iraq was partially spared, but support for it is divided. Although Pakistan is mediating, it has a defense pact with Saudi Arabia that makes its ultimate allegiance clear. Tehran bared its fangs to others nearby, and the cost was steep. It is difficult to thrive when your neighbors are largely loathe to shatter the lavish veneer of peace and prosperity.
Barring an accident or some outrageous irrationality by hardliners, a return to full-scale hostilities seems less likely than a negotiated compromise, especially given the unusually close positions of the United States and Iran after 16 hours of talks in Pakistan. Diplomatic negotiation rhetoric often says the opposite. If negotiations are not going well, the rule is to talk about progress to encourage further negotiations. When success seems close, he infuriates his opponents by revealing that there is a dangerous and unfathomable chasm that must be overcome.
However, both countries appear to agree that reopening the Strait of Hormuz is possible, and the US blockade of Iranian ports has significantly reduced Iran’s influence on the issue. Iran knows it needs to allow free or more free travel to ease pressure on China. The current dispute is more about the details than the actual nature of the deal.
Both sides agree to a moratorium on nuclear enrichment. Iran wants the deal to last for five years, halfway through the term of the next U.S. president, a U.S. official said. The United States wants 20 years, a person familiar with the discussions said. Uncreative calculations here can easily lead to compromises. (Bartering for sanctions relief is a similar numbers game).
Iran’s enrichment capacity has been diminished by bombings this year and last. What remains is more than 400 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium, which President Trump claimed was sitting in the dust. With U.S. and Israeli air superiority and surveillance now at their peak, it is unlikely that the Iranian government believes this stockpile can be easily converted into a bomb any time soon.
The issue is more of a question of Iranian sovereignty, and could be resolved by using the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to remove or sell Iran to Russia, “down-blend” it to a lower enrichment level, and monitor containers as part of a broader pre-war verification mission that the United States wants to reactivate Iran.
The wild card remains Israel. Iran wants to leave its proxies such as Lebanon alone. Through weeks of fighting and rocket attacks, Hezbollah has made clear that the 2024 war will not leave them permanently crippled. It remains unclear whether Israel wants a long-term occupation in the south, and Israeli attacks, with the exception of last week’s horrifying onslaught on Beirut, appear to be designed to reduce the frequency of regular atrocities so as not to provoke the same outrage as the atrocities in Gaza.
The Lebanese government has been in its first direct talks with Israel for years, but again, its promises to disarm Hezbollah have not been fulfilled and are unlikely to do so in the near future. Further talks are likely to wrap up the issue in a separate document, allowing Israel to strike if it sees fit, Lebanon to reduce the tempo of its bombing and its occupation, and the United States to signal progress towards a resolution.
The challenges to a U.S.-Iran deal resemble smaller details of pride and position rather than insurmountable hurdles. Neither side can accept an agreement that cannot be pretended to be a victory. Iran must feel that it still has military deterrence. Iran must feel that it is projecting enough force and disruption to make a new onslaught less likely, rather than more likely.
Trump has upset just about everyone over the past two months, from Pope Leo to Israel. He needs to come out of the big war he originally chose with a deal that allows his (former) supporters to sell them a better world than the one we lived in before February 28th – a near-miss with a global recession and energy market collapse.
Two eternal questions will haunt President Trump. Is there a better deal than the grand deal with Iran that President Barack Obama signed in 2015 and that President Trump abandoned during his first term? It would be difficult to define it. Iran’s nuclear infrastructure has sustained extensive damage, and it is within reach as President Trump seeks to leave it without enrichment or the means to further enrich it.
The second is Iran, which seems to have emerged from the dust. It is in great decline, falling into disrepair, and suffering from infrastructure damage that may be felt for a generation. But its resilience is self-evident, and the past year’s intermittent wars may have decisively silenced moderate voices suggesting that Iran does not need strong means to defend itself.
President Trump may secure an agreement to reduce Iran’s bomb-making capabilities. But the unintended consequences of the first war he chose are just beginning to emerge. And first, Iranian hardliners undoubtedly feel they need the bomb now more than ever.
