Visitors check out the Optimus humanoid exhibited by Tesla at the World Artificial Intelligence Conference on Monday, July 28, 2025 in Shanghai, China.
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Elon Musk’s quest to become the world’s first millionaire is increasingly based on one proposition. tesla It could evolve from an electric car company to a robot powerhouse. Mr. Musk has repeatedly insisted that the company’s future reputation rests not on cars but on an “army” of humanoid robots called Optimus that are fully autonomous and could someday do the jobs of millions of people. This is a bold vision, a big bet, and one that many technologists believe is both technically sound and economically transformative.
But let’s take a step back and soberly consider the inconvenient truth that investors may be underestimating amid all the hype. That said, Mr. Musk’s grand vision is that China will only expand if China allows it to expand. And as the Chinese government finalizes the framework for its 15th Five-Year Plan (15FYP), China is signaling that robotics and bodily AI are the realm of the future, a national capability that Xi Jinping sees as central to the country’s industrial future. That means Musk isn’t just competing with Silicon Valley. He is countering the full strength of the Chinese state and its determination to make robotics the engine of the next stage of national development.
In 2023, China installed more than 290,000 industrial robots. This is more than the rest of the world combined. Robot density reached 470 robots per 10,000 workers, surpassing Japan and Germany for the first time. This was not an entirely organic market movement. This was the result of targeted state intervention, including large subsidies for robot deployment, low-cost loans, and mandates for state governments to include automation in their industrial restructuring plans.
Chinese leadership is now taking robotics to the next level. In late October, when the Fourth Plenum released the draft 15FYP guidance, the new phrase “new quality productive force” (NQPF) dominated the document. This may sound like rhetoric to Western ears, but in China’s policy system this is a clear signal. Growth over the next decade will depend on AI-driven robot productivity rather than an abundant and cheap workforce.
This will be promoted by the government and society as a whole, and the Chinese state is also preparing accordingly. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology has launched the “Robotics + Applications” initiative to incorporate robots in the fields of logistics, medicine, warehousing, construction and energy. Hundreds of robot pilot zones and test platforms have been established across the country. National standards for humanoid robots, which govern everything from operational safety to human-robot interaction, were drafted this year, long before the U.S. began the process.
And Beijing began to flaunt its progress. China’s recent “robot game” combined competition and industrial showcase and featured bipedal robots walking on beams, balancing on narrow ledges, navigating obstacle courses and assembling parts on a mock production line. Videos of these demonstrations, some impressive and others eerily disturbing, went viral on Chinese platforms and Western tech feeds alike. They were intended to send a message that China was preparing for a large-scale industrialization of humanoid robots.
Tesla’s Optimus needs what China is building
This brings us back to Mr. Musk’s billionaire ambitions. Optimus is a moonshot, but his success doesn’t depend on flashy demonstrations or robot dance-offs. It depends on large-scale deployments where robots learn, improve, and demonstrate economic value within real-world industrial and commercial environments. Humanoid robots evolve through tasks such as walking, grasping, carrying, assembling, coordinating, and networking. Full maturity requires a dense ecosystem of factories, warehouses, distribution centers, and integrated humans and machines. And currently, only China is building this integrated ecosystem at scale.
This is where many investors misjudge the terrain. China won’t just influence the future of Tesla’s robotics. Perhaps it will be structured. Mr. Musk can prototype Optimus in California or Texas, but he needs China’s industrial ecosystem to manufacture it at scale and affordably. No other country has such a high concentration of component suppliers, precision manufacturers, and high-volume assembly capacity. But access to that ecosystem is conditional and dependent on the goodwill of the Chinese government and good relations between the United States and China. Producing foreign-controlled humanoid robots in China requires political comfort, regulatory approval, and a tacit understanding that China cannot lose the race to the future of robotics to the detriment of its own companies to foreign competitors. The Chinese government can grant, condition, throttle, or block access depending on how Optimus fits into China’s own strategic calculations and goals.

Even if Tesla were to build its robots elsewhere, it would still be highly dependent on China. China leads in the production, cost, and improvement of nearly all of the humanoids, including the servo motors that drive their joints, the harmonic reducers that give them fluid motion, force and torque sensors, machine vision modules, LFP batteries that stabilize their center of gravity, and the aluminum alloys and special steel that form their skeletons. Mr. Musk can diversify his assembly, but he cannot escape dependence on China’s hardware ecosystem unless other countries spend years and billions of dollars copying it.
And hardware is just step one. Humanoid robots require deployment, and China offers the world’s richest terrain for training and repetition. Its factories are vast, diverse and highly robotic, and there are no unions to protest the forced removal of workers. Its pilot zones and robot-heavy industrial parks are growing. If Optimus is unable to operate in China’s industrial environment, Tesla will lose the most valuable data set and learning environment available to robotics companies, something that no Western economy currently has a match for.
China is also trying to establish rules in this area. We are drafting a national standard for humanoids that defines how humanoids move, connect, exchange data, and interact with humans. All robots operating in China must comply. Additionally, because humanoids collect sensitive spatial and operational data, systems like Optimus are subject to increased scrutiny under China’s national security and data governance laws. This is not a hypothesis. It is already codified in Chinese law.
China’s 15FYP envisions a world in which Chinese-made humanoid robots are central to industrial sophistication, supply chain resilience, and national competitiveness. It envisions that the domestic ecosystem of components, manufacturing, deployment, and standards will be controlled and driven by Chinese companies. In this world, robots are national and strategic assets, not vanity projects.
China’s reality and current trajectory do not quite match Musk’s desire to build a global fleet of Optimus robots, an army of robots deployed around the world. Presumably, they want to both manufacture and deploy within China. If this turns out to be the case, as many suspect, Tesla will at some point face a tough choice between adapting Optimus to access China’s regulatory structure or developing it outside of the world’s most important robotics ecosystem. Either way, the millionaires’ story has real costs.
Elon Musk could build an army of robots. He might even be able to design it, create a prototype, and deploy it around the world. But whether that robot army reaches the scale necessary to justify multitrillion-dollar valuations and multitrillion-dollar salaries is no longer a simple technology question. It’s geopolitical. And the answer, for now, lies in Beijing.
—Dewardrick McNeil, Managing Director and Senior Policy Analyst, Longview Global, CNBC Contributor

