If you have your back to the wall, you won’t hit your head.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is perhaps in the most precarious position ever. But with NATO meeting in Ankara this week, is this really the moment he chooses to put the alliance to the test?
His choice of war, which is dragging down Russia’s economy along with his approval ratings in public opinion polls, is now in its fifth year. Questions are growing about what President Putin can do with Ukraine’s newfound confidence as long- and medium-range shelling of Kiev continues, causing widespread damage that leaves gas starved and black smoke rising over Moscow’s skyline.
Chief among them is whether he can or will escalate a counterattack not only against Ukraine but also against its NATO supporters.
There are persistent fears that Russia will open a new front in Europe. Poland has reportedly been warned by the United States that Moscow could attack in limited ways, perhaps with drones or other forms of hybrid warfare, but still in ways unthinkable decades ago.
Estonia has been observing Russian men in military uniforms near its border for the past year. A Danish airport has been shut down by an unknown drone in its airspace. Oslo has been intermittently concerned that the small Russian settlement of Barentsburg on Norway’s Svalbard archipelago is on the verge of becoming something bigger. Could President Putin’s decision to issue Russian passports to residents of the Transnistrian breakaway region of Moldova become something more sinister?
Duchess Kate’s wheels of anxiety are spinning with some legitimacy at the largest military alliance in history. After President Putin’s unfortunate and misguided decision to invade Ukraine in 2022, with the military woefully unable to match the world’s third-largest budget and a decision made under inadequate intelligence assessments, it would be unwise to conclude that President Putin will not succumb to very bad ideas. And Russia’s true position, and Putin’s dilemma with it, can be visualized in a split screen of competing perspectives.
On the left is an image of weakness. Moscow is in a completely different position geopolitically, domestically, and militarily than it was in February 2022. It no longer has the luxury of being wrong – oil refineries have been attacked by Ukrainian drones, and the hydrocarbon powerhouse is importing gasoline, depleting foreign exchange reserves to prop up the war effort, and emptying prisons to fill manning gaps on the Ukrainian front. In effect, it became a vassal state of Beijing. We need substantial military aid from North Korea and Iran. The Kremlin prioritizes air defense to protect its walls itself. Needless to say, I’m bad at drawing.
On the contrary, on the right side of the screen there is an image of Russian preparations. Factories are being repurposed to constantly feed the war machine. Elementary school students meet veterans of fierce fighting in Ukraine. State television has long been integrated into propaganda operations. Conflict is dominating daily life in Russia in a way not seen in decades, but while many in NATO countries feel the conflict is a relatively distant issue and straining budgets, the male population of fighting age does not.
In such a situation, a broader conflict with NATO, an enemy that President Putin has always denounced, could help explain Russia’s gradual stalemate in the situation in Ukraine and justify a broader war or even full-scale mobilization within Russia. Putin will finally be able to claim that he is waging a battle for the survival of the post-Soviet world, rather than a faltering effort to invade a smaller neighbor. While NATO members are still bickering over how much their defense budget should be for the next few years, Russia is currently spending perhaps 7% of its GDP, and perhaps half of its national budget, on war.
The counter argument is that now is the perfect time for Russia to test NATO. U.S. President Donald Trump routinely cuts defense alliances when Russia is ready, and Europe’s finances remain strained by the coronavirus. But Russia has few options, and the adage from the start of the war still stands: a weak and defeated Russia cannot suddenly grow 100 meters tall.
Practical limitations persist, even for dictators who are believed to spend much of their time isolated in underground bunkers. Major attacks on Kiev have occurred every 10 to 15 days in recent months, but the pace has accelerated in recent days, indicating that Russia either has limited munitions or is unable to create new targets fast enough to strike more frequently. Putin has often resorted to announcing completely fictitious military victories, and the pace of Russian military advances on the front has slowed to a minimum, with the Ministry of Defense recently claiming they had captured the hard-fought Donbas town of Kostyantynivka. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy immediately called Putin’s bluff and offered to meet on the ground to discuss peace.
The Institute for the Study of War, a US-based think tank, suggested that the Kremlin’s announcement was aimed at convincing the White House that Russia was making progress and influencing a resumption of diplomacy. But claiming false victory is the embodiment of weakness.
The dilemma, then, is whether Putin feels safer fighting a war with Ukraine, which he currently cannot win, or a war in which he can justify defeat with NATO.
The time may have passed for the Kremlin to be ambivalent about the White House regarding the fate of Europe.
Despite the public unrest shown by President Trump and Pentagon Secretary Pete Hegseth, it is clear that Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s more traditionalist tenets of Republican foreign policy continue to waver as the midterm elections approach. Europe is also under pressure to build its own defenses after the United States’ recent failure to acquire Greenland, creating yet another problem for Moscow.
It is unlikely that Russia will attempt to use nuclear weapons to pressure NATO. This will definitely infuriate the US and even China. And there’s also the risk that these doomsday devices won’t work as planned. This is probably the most powerful threat if left unused.
The trick for Putin, therefore, will be to try to find mechanisms for chaos and disruption without forcing the traditional tests of transatlantic resolve.
The past decade has seen scattered attempts by Russia to coerce Western powers, which have been reluctant to respond to a full-scale conflict, in ways that give them sufficient room to maneuver. From the use of the nerve agent Novichok in the British city of Salisbury to suspected spy ships roaming on undersea cables to allegations of election meddling, Moscow has long been trying to figure out how far it can push the West without provoking another major conflict.
Putin’s main advantage as a leader is his longevity. He will not be bothered by the four-year cycle of fully democratic elections in which Western opponents seek quick solutions. He can wait out the current cycle of NATO leadership, battlefield setbacks, and Ukrainian technological superiority.
President Putin is not immune to the effects of time, and one day his reign will end. He may be smart enough not to hasten that moment by escalating a fight he’s about to lose.
