Of the more than 20 foreign leaders invited to Xi Jinping’s massive military parade in Beijing last week, none of them fell as diplomatic wind as Kim Jong Un.
The hidden North Korean leaders seized the global spotlight with their high-profile debut in multilateral diplomacy, side by side with XI and Russia’s Vladimir Putin, with Western rebellious demonstrations that they enjoyed the support of the two most powerful dictators of the world, enjoying a central role in an alternative global order.
In his side job, Kim emphasized his bond with President Putin. Putin vowed that he will “never forget” the sacrifices of North Korean forces fighting against Ukraine. He also held his first summit at XI for the first time in six years, regaining relations with long-standing guardians who were strained by the growth of the military alliance with Pyongyang and Moscow.
To conclude, Kim was hosted by tea and banquet at his residence in Zhongnanhai, a walled compound of leadership at the heart of Chinese political power. That privilege was not granted to the other 26 foreign guests of the parade, except for Putin.
For a young leader who has long been treated as junior partners from both Beijing and Moscow, the promoted treatment was a phenomenal propaganda coup.
But his most consequential victory may not have been staged for the camera, but it was unsaid.
This was the first official reading of the Xi-Kim Summit, and it did not mention the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. This is a prominent departure from the language of the five summits held between 2018 and 2019.
Analysts say the omission could indicate that Kim has secured what he has long wanted: the implicit acceptance of China’s North Korean nuclear weapons.
This would mark an astonishing turn for Beijing, which has long defended its denuclearized South Korean peninsula’s targets, even if Pyongyang accelerated its illegal nuclear and missile programme under Kim.
“The denuclearization goals formally removed from the official readout of the Xi-Kim conference confirmed a significant change in China’s long-term policy,” said Tong Zhao, senior fellow at the Carnegie Fund for International Peace.
“Reluctantly and importantly, North Korea’s most powerful allies have abandoned their pursuit of a nuclear-free South Korean peninsula.”
Encouraged by a trip to Beijing, Kim saw tests of North Korea’s new high-thrasing stroke engine on Monday. State media said it will be used to power Pyongyang’s latest intercontinental ballistic missile, Hwasong-20.
“North Korea has been given the justification to continue to maintain nuclear power,” said Lim Eul-Chul, a professor at the Institute of Far East Research, Gyeongnam University in Seoul, and said he has pledged to strengthen relations “no matter how the international situation changes.”
Young Moo-jin, a professor at North Korea University in Seoul, said Kim was the biggest winner of Beijing’s victory day parade.
“Kim’s international status has risen significantly,” he said, adding that “restoring relations with China through economic cooperation could potentially be used in (future) negotiations with the United States.”
US President Donald Trump has shown his willingness to remarry Kim diplomatically despite his first attempt at attacking denuclearized deals with North Korean leaders collapsed.
However, the US president is already suffering from many foreign policy headaches. His attempts to end the Russian war with Ukraine have reached nowhere. And Israel’s unprecedented strike against Hamas officials in American ally Qatar took another blow to his international credibility.
As a major North Korean alliance and economic lifeline, China has long been the center of global efforts to curb Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions, and sometimes works in conjunction with the United States. Beijing has played a tool in leading Kim’s administration to the negotiation table and voting for votes in favour of UN sanctions at multiple points.
However, as strengthening strategic rivalry worsened US-China relations, Beijing reduced cooperation by thwarting North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. And so are Russia, which has been solid support for nuclear non-proliferation since its invasion of Ukraine.
In 2022, China and Russia jointly rejected a US-led resolution at the UN Security Council calling for additional sanctions on the launch of new North Korea ballistic missiles.
It was at the 2024 trilateral summit between Japan and South Korea that China reaffirmed its commitment to a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. It drew a ferocious response from Pyongyang, which denounced the Joint Declaration as “political provocation of the grave” and a violation of its sovereignty.
Since then, Beijing has refrained from referring to its targets in official statements and documents, Zhao noted.
Meanwhile, Russia’s growing military ties with North Korea concluded with the signing of last year’s Mutual Defense Treaty – raised concerns that Prinyan could help strengthen missile technology and nuclear weapons delivery systems in exchange for weapons and troops.
In public, Russian officials are approaching openly supporting North Korea’s nuclear program. Last September, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared that Moscow saw North Korea’s denuclearization as a “closure issue” and that Pyongyang understands its dependence on nuclear weapons as the basis of its defense. By July, Lavrov went a step further and said that Russia “respects” North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.
Although Beijing is not as far apart as Moscow, the quiet abandonment of its target of denuclearization shows subtle yet consequential changes. This could open the door to South Korea’s ties in northern China, or even strengthen the momentum for trilateral cooperation with Russia.
Despite the unprecedented communal appearance above the gates of peace in Beijing’s heaven during the military parade, it was not reported that XI, Putin and Kim had convened a trilateral summit on the bystanders.
Wu Qian, an independent political analyst in Beijing, said acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear state could form part of Putin’s vision for a world order no longer controlled by the US and its allies.
“At least, the Pyongyang dul and nuclear threat in China suggest that such disruption is thought to serve China’s strategic interests. As long as the weakening of the existing order is consistent with the goal, Beijing may be willing to protect it,” he said.
This is in stark contrast to the 10 years since China and Russia voted for the US on the UN Security Council in 2016 and 2017 to tighten sanctions on North Korea.
In fact, in 2015, then South Korea President Park Geun Hai stood next to Xi and Putin, to review the military parade 70 years after the end of World War II.
Some experts warn that the public omission of denuclearization by Xi and Kim may not change China’s official stance.
Shuxian Luo, assistant professor of Asian studies at the University of Hawaii in Manoa, said that although the usual call for denuclearization at the summit has been dropped, it is unlikely that he has abandoned the position in private discussions with North Korean officials.
Beijing has long viewed Pyongyang as both a strategic asset and an unstable liability.
While North Korea served as a geopolitical buffer for the US and its allies in East Asia, the pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles undermined regional security and handed Washington justification to expand its military presence at China’s gateway. They also risk developing their own nuclear weapons, triggering a chain reaction and other regions like South Korea and Japan, particularly amid doubts over the reliability of the US nuclear umbrella under Trump.
Already, South Korea is facing a growing call in the home for long-term security solutions that could include nuclear deterrent for Indigenous peoples, Zhao said. “It is unlikely under the current progressive government, but the overall chances of such development are increasing,” he added.
China’s implicit acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear state could also be influenced by signalling from senior Trump administration officials expressing tolerance for allied nuclear proliferation, as well as Beijing’s concerns about the auricle. China portrays Orcus as a step towards the transfer of nuclear weapon materials.
“By interpreting these actions as evidence that Washington is moving away from its principled non-proliferation stance, Beijing may be justified in prioritizing geopolitical interests to global non-proliferation standards,” Zhao said. “This sends a nasty signal that can burn other nuclear states and exploit great competition for their own spread ambitions.”
