Without firing a shot, Russian President Vladimir Putin was able to bring the war in Ukraine last week to millions of Europeans who are barely touched by the conflict.
And it started with a whisper, not a bang.
After Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen’s unsettling Danes on Thursday night, the drones sparked major disruption at several airports, Europe should think “we see more violent and frequent hybrid attacks as a new reality.” But she did not cite Russia as the direct perpetrator – perhaps there is a lack of evidence so far, or Moscow’s purpose is feeding too sharply, instead as the main threat of Europe.
A lack of clarity is one symptom of these attacks. Anonymous culprits cannot name or halt for a while, regardless of damage or mild inconvenience. And waits and uncertainties are different. Fredericksen added another motive to the unknown attacker.
The same story unfolds in Europe.
Was Russia really planning to send over 20 drones to Poland? Was there a 12-minute violation of Estonian airspace, suggested by Alexus Grinkeivic, the top US general in Europe, or as an expansion of Moscow’s invasion, leading to poor training of Russian pilots? How can a hacking attack grounding various flights across Europe in a few days?
After the three-day airport closure and reported spotting of Russian military ships left its transponder and sat from the coast, it is not clear whether Danish officials are still behind the attack.
Fredericksen hastily admitted the risks of both the wrong and slow answers. Danish military intelligence news agency said it could not “name” the perpetrator on Thursday night, but Pet, the head of internal security police, said “the risk of Russian sabotage in Denmark is high.”
Otherwise, Denmark is open about Putin’s threat. Gives a Ukrainian F16, helping to build a drone, and is armed with long-range missiles as part of a deterrent effort.
Western officials struggle with the paradox of hybrid wars every day – whether to assign responsibility.
Does the real perpetrator, especially Russia, actually reinforce the discord and anxiety they want to sew? Or, if you don’t emphasize the growing threat, are you not ready for the problem until the moment when society is blind and not addressing the problem requires harsh defensive action and choice? Political and hypothetical, it is much easier to shoot down a Russian jet a few months after publicly denounced Moscow for airport closures and confusion.
For months, the illusion of sabotage has crept into the mainland of Europe.
The UK has seen another enthusiastic sponsor of Ukrainian defense – a young gang-like criminal convicted under the furious conditions of national security law, adopted by Russia and set fires in warehouses holding Ukrainian supplies. British police arrested a 41-year-old man and a 35-year-old woman in Essex under the same law last week.
Poland imprisoned young Ukrainians for a Russian-sponsored arson attack.
Airport check-in software and London nursery have been hacked, but perhaps not by Moscow agents, but by criminal gangs.
Regardless of who is responsible, this disruption and spread of vulnerability allowed Putin to bring a sense of conflict spreading to the European door.
It feels more palpable in European homes than the urgent and inevitable costs of support in Ukraine. Amplifies Putin Assurz’s argument – suggests giving him what he wants if he stops – and those who say the Kremlin’s appetite to the attack is OK and a critical response is needed.
And this threat temporarily puts diverting European policymakers and budgets from the heavier and consequential tasks of the dangers of Ukraine’s frontline.
It is to some extent a miracle that the Russian summer attacks do not take up any more territory. However, attacks on Ukrainian cities have grown relentlessly.
The hybrid disruptions over the past few weeks have added two costly challenges to Europe’s tense defense budget: increased infrastructure resilience to drones and hackers, and wide, constant and expensive aviation defenses to Russian drones and jets across the eastern border.
The cost of defense against multiple cheap drones has yet to mimic the extraordinary efficiency this new threat represents. The Dutch F35 can fire missiles worth tens of thousands of euros to fire Poland’s $30,000 Shahede-shaped polystyrene drone. However, this is unsustainable over a long period of time, and the intruders are too expensive, leaving a troublesome choice between not intercepting intruders or spending millions of people each month on robust, endless defenses in NATO airspace.
Not all the roses of the Kremlin. Their outsourcing disruptors — or spies competing for favors — run a considerable risk of overstomping and killing civilians in NATO countries.
Russia is at risk of being criticized for what they didn’t do, and there is a risk of covering real organized crime to expand its activities. There is a risk that President Donald Trump’s unpredictable nature will lead to an unbalanced response to any escalation. He can also reject a response at all or react in a very overreacting manner.
This broad unpredictability is how greater competition begins.
Again, that’s not all in Putin’s favor. He’s not a fan of harsh risk. He invaded Ukraine after being told that it would take several weeks to overrun. He appears to have escalated against Kyiv and Europe in recent weeks only after the very chammy summit with Chinese president Xi Jinping.
For now, however, these hybrid attacks, either by design or by chance, impose a sense of cost on ordinary Europeans for the enduring government support to Ukraine.
The delays at airports, rising gas prices, and the non-fatal inconvenience of hacking attacks are comparable to what ordinary civilians in the very country who launched an unprovoked invasion and killed innocent Ukrainians every day, if there were no traces of irony.
However, last month Europe was given a new, expensive set of worries, as there are no easy perpetrators or cheap fixes.
That short-term distraction is certainly a victory for Putin, the fourth year of an existential import war.
