When a group of defense insiders gathered in Whitehall, the seat of the British government, last month to discuss how prepared Britain and its allies are for a likely war in the next few years, their verdict was pretty damning.
The people who gathered at the conference, organized by the London-based think tank Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), were not warmongers. They were people in the know. Current and former military personnel, government and NATO officials, researchers, and defense industry experts who base their ideas on widely accepted intelligence assessments that Russia is preparing for the possibility of a direct conflict with Europe.
The only way to prevent that, they say, is to make sure that if war breaks out, Europe wins.
More investment in Europe’s chronically underfunded defenses will be key, but security experts are increasingly warning that a major shift in thinking across the board is needed. They say the time has come for European governments to involve their people and make it clear that the days when Europe could ignore the threat of war are over.
“I think there are signs that society is willing to have this kind of dialogue, but I also think that there are some governments that don’t yet have enough confidence to have that kind of dialogue with their people,” said Sam Green, a professor of Russian politics at King’s College London and an expert on democratic resilience.
There is a growing consensus among experts that Russia is already waging a hybrid war against the West by carrying out subversive activities and injecting confusion and disinformation into domestic political debates. They point to overwhelming evidence, including repeated violations of NATO airspace by Russian aircraft and drones and GPS jamming in the Baltic states, as well as disinformation campaigns and sabotage attacks on critical infrastructure in several countries, that point to Russian secret services as the source. Russia has consistently denied any involvement.
Green said these attacks have already changed the perspective of many in Europe, even if some politicians remain reluctant to label them outright hybrid warfare.
“I think people are scared, especially as this becomes more visible,” he said. “We’re seeing drones outside of airports, and I think there’s a growing recognition that it’s probably only a matter of time before these drones bring down airliners.”
Although Russia has not launched direct attacks against NATO allies in Europe (experts say this is partly because Russia knows it cannot break the alliance with its current capabilities), there are increasing signs that this may change in the future.
NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte warned earlier this year that Russia was prepared to use military force against NATO within five years. German Foreign Minister Johann Vardepur echoed this warning in a speech last month, saying German intelligence believed Russia “remains open to the option of war with NATO at least by 2029 at the latest.”
Russian President Vladimir Putin said in early December that Russia had no intention of going to war with Europe, but that “if Europe suddenly wanted to go to war with us, we would be ready right now.”
The agreement between the Baltic states is that an attack on them could occur as early as three years. Researchers at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Studies examined warnings and predictions made by various officials about Russia’s readiness and willingness to go to war against NATO and found that 2027 and 2028 are the most frequently mentioned dates.
Recognition of this threat led NATO to develop contingency plans on how to defend against a possible Russian invasion of the Baltic states.
But experts warn that the alliance’s plans do not make sense.
Jack Watling, senior research fellow at RUSI, said: “We have plans with numbers, but governments are not taking the steps necessary to implement them. We are still planning on something that doesn’t exist.” He highlighted the risks of trying to build a defense response based on wish lists rather than reality, rather than accepting available resources and planning accordingly.
Earlier this year, the British government commissioned three prominent experts – former NATO chief George Robertson, former joint force commander General Richard Barrons, and former senior director of the US National Security Council Fiona Hill – to conduct a strategic review of the UK’s defence. The trio presented a manual on the steps needed to prepare for war.
Speaking at last month’s RUSI event, Mr Barrons said the UK needed to rethink the resilience of its infrastructure, build up its military, reserve and civil defence, and invest in its health services, industry and economy to enable the transition to combat readiness.
“Frankly, we don’t need any more analysis to know what we need to do. The question is, we need to actually do it,” he said. He cited other concerns from “civil society and politicians” as reasons for the lack of haste.
He said Britain was moving in the right direction but at its current pace it would take around 10 years to be ready for war.
“And our analysis and our allies are telling us, well, maybe you have three to five years… So this is a question of will, a question of social as well as political, and a question of ability. Maybe we need to do better,” he said.
Many European capitals, including London, have given little thought to defense over the past few decades. There has been no major direct military conflict on the continent since 1945, making Europe the longest period of peace in centuries.
These decades of relative calm have brought great peace benefits. Successive governments were able to spend money on welfare rather than defense, making life much more comfortable for ordinary Europeans, while also turning to the world’s largest military spender, the United States, for help if the need arose.
Then came two harsh awakenings. The election of Donald Trump as president of the United States, making it clear to NATO allies that they can no longer rely so heavily on the United States, and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
This breakthrough has led most of NATO’s European member states to increase their defense spending. According to NATO data, 31 of the country’s 32 members are on track to meet the goal of spending 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense this year, compared to just six in 2021, the year before Russia launched its invasion. Iceland, a founding member of NATO and the only country not expected to achieve its goals, does not have its own military. In return, it contributes financially in the form of civilian personnel and air defense and surveillance systems.
NATO members agreed in June to raise this target to 5% of GDP by 2035. But many analysts are skeptical of the goal, especially as most European countries face fiscal pressures without considering significant increases in defense spending.
Explaining to voters that some resources may need to be reallocated, and that perhaps more people may need to serve in the reserves or regular army, is not something most politicians want to do.
Several Eurobarometer surveys measuring public opinion across the European Union have shown this year that an overwhelming majority of Europeans (78%) are concerned about the EU’s national defense and security over the next five years. One-third of people think defense should be one of the region’s spending priorities.
Nevertheless, French military commander General Fabien Mandon provoked a backlash last month when he warned the French public that France must prepare for possible future losses against Russian aggression, saying that in order to “defend us” France must “accept the loss of our children.”
Robin Potter, an academic researcher at Chatham House, a UK-based think tank, said people across Europe differed widely in their willingness to understand the threat and take part in countering it.
“If you’re in the east, maybe bordering Russia, if you’re in Poland or the Baltics, the threat is very real for the people there, and they consider the risk of air raids to be higher, so we’re taking more measures in terms of public shelters,” he said.
Last year, Sweden and Finland updated their citizens’ guidance on how to survive war, distributing booklets on how to prepare for communications failures, power outages and extreme weather. Several countries, including Lithuania, Latvia, and Sweden, have reintroduced military conscription in the past decade, while others, including Germany, Poland, Belgium, Romania, and Bulgaria, have introduced voluntary military training programs for their citizens.
Mr Potter said citizens with deep faith in their own institutions were more likely to accept sacrifices for the broader good.
“If people feel like the state is working for them, they’re probably more likely to want to give something back,” he says. He pointed to countries that consistently rank high in welfare, happiness and well-being, and where the concept of national duty and “total defense” is deeply rooted – in which all citizens, businesses and public bodies become part of the war effort if necessary.
“I think the question is whether you can just lift that model and introduce it into a completely different society like the UK, where trust in public institutions is very low.”
