How GPS interference is wreaking havoc in the Middle East

Hours after the first salvo of the U.S. and Israeli “first” strike against Iran on February 28, data analysis firm Kupler observed ships in the Persian Gulf making unusual navigational moves, with position data from ships in the Gulf showing them moving over land and making sharp turns in polygonal paths.

Similar disruptions to location services have proliferated across the Middle East since the war began, impacting sailors, airliners, motorists and others alike.

These disruptions also revealed significant vulnerabilities in GPS, the American system that is now synonymous with satellite navigation.

For years, companies like Kpler have reported thousands of oil tankers in the Persian Gulf manipulating their onboard Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals, a system used to track ships while they are underway, to circumvent sanctions on Iranian oil exports.

This manipulation of location signals, known as spoofing, can hide a ship’s movements and has long been used as a tool in “covert” operations, said Anna Subasic, a trade risk analyst at Kpler.

However, since the fighting in the Middle East began, location falsification in the Persian Gulf has increased dramatically. Maritime information firm Windward recorded more than 1,100 vessels experiencing AIS interference across the Gulf within the first 24 hours of the conflict, a 55% increase a week later.

“There are a number of organizations in the region that seek to interfere with GPS and other satellite navigation signals for a variety of reasons,” Clayton Swope, deputy director of the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said in an email to CNBC.

Further interference with satellite navigation signals across the region is likely coming from Gulf states seeking to protect themselves from drone and missile attacks on critical infrastructure by “disrupting” the onboard navigation systems of hostile drones and missiles, Swope said.

This form of electronic interference is increasingly deployed as a means of defense in modern warfare, and similar disruptions occurred after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, according to the CSIS report.

However, this disturbance also disrupted many aspects of daily life.

The interference causes the aircraft to appear to be flying in an irregular wave-like pattern. On land, food delivery drivers have been seen off the coast of Dubai due to GPS system malfunctions.

Persistent sabotage and spoofing activity in the region also raises important public safety concerns, said Lisa Dyer, executive director of the GPS Innovation Alliance.

Although the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has significantly reduced shipping activity in the Persian Gulf, ships flagged by foreign countries such as China and India still have the right of passage.

For ships exporting oil from the Gulf, accurate location data is critical to reducing the risk of collisions and groundings as they navigate the narrow strait, which is only 21 miles (33 kilometers) wide at its narrowest point, Kupler’s Subasic said.

In addition to navigational challenges for ships and aircraft in the region, Dyer said in a call with CNBC that interference with satellite navigation systems could also hamper the response of emergency services that rely on navigational aids.

Despite widespread interference across the region, Iranian attacks continue unabated, raising speculation about the source of Iran’s military power.

“At this point, there is evidence that Iran has been given access to China’s BeiDou,” said Jack Hidary, CEO of navigation technology startup Sandbox AQ, referring to China’s global satellite navigation system. “This allows Iran to be more precise in its missile attacks and their targets,” Hidary told CNBC’s Dan Murphy in a March 17 television interview.

Other analysts cited in publications such as Al Jazeera also attributed the apparent accuracy of Iran’s attacks to China’s use of BeiDou.

Missiles and drones often aim using a combination of satellite-based navigation systems and other systems such as inertial navigation capabilities that operate independently of satellite-based signals.

Similar to GPS, which was originally a U.S. Department of Defense project, the Chinese government developed BeiDou for military use after the 1995 Taiwan Strait crisis deemed it overly dependent on U.S.-made GPS. At that time, a ballistic missile was reportedly lost in the Taiwan Strait due to GPS confusion.

Luca Ferrara, general manager of AQNav, SandboxAQ’s navigation product, said that in its third version since its launch in 2000, BeiDou has been expanded to a variety of commercial applications and “has the largest network” compared to other constellations such as GPS, Europe’s Galileo and Russia’s Glonass.

Although the Iranian government has not officially commented on BeiDou’s use, Iran’s Deputy Minister of Communications and Information Technology Ehsan Chitsaz reportedly praised BeiDou’s precision and structure after the 12-day war between Iran and Israel last June, according to Chinese state media Xinhua News Agency.

Iranian and Chinese authorities did not respond to CNBC’s requests for comment.

But other analysts aren’t surprised by these claims.

Even if that were true, Iran’s use of BeiDou would probably make little sense because “no active coordination or support from China would be required,” said Swope of CSIS.

“Modern chips used for satellite navigation can receive signals from all four major satellite navigation systems in the world, so Iran could be using BeiDou, or even GLONASS or Galileo,” Swope said.

Dyer, of the GPS Innovation Alliance, added that most commercial receivers “use (multiple) constellations for navigation” and are “interoperable in some respects.”

Even if Iran were to use BeiDou as a satellite-based navigation system, it would still be vulnerable to the same jamming and spoofing risks as GPS, Dyer said.

For those in the industry, the war in the Middle East has exposed the vulnerabilities of satellite-based navigation systems.

“What’s really being challenged now is the belief that satellite-based systems can serve as the sole basis for positioning, navigation and timing,” said Ferrara of SandboxAQ, which is trialling technology that relies on the Earth’s magnetic field rather than satellite signals.

The emergence of satellite-based networks like China’s Beidou and Russia’s Glonass is also “challenging America’s traditional strategic advantages,” Ferrara said, adding that these GPS alternatives are eroding America’s “influence over global navigation.”

But Washington may still have an ace.

As speculation mounts that a ground invasion by the U.S. military is imminent, the U.S. military may be one of the forces least affected by the electronic interference blanketing the region.

Swope said the U.S. military is upgrading to a new “jamming-resistant” GPS signal designed for operations in environments with strong interference.

“Even with persistent obstruction…the military should still be able to conduct operations,” Swope said.